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Abstract: 
In this paper a methodical empirical analysis of the bank lending channel of monetary 
transmission in the European Union’s 10 new member states is conducted. We specifically 
investigate the influence of monetary policy changes on bank lending activity and if this 
potential influence is contingent on bank characteristics, such as banks’ size, capital, liquidity 
and risk factor. Panel data compiled from a large number of banks from 2004 to 2013, and 
dynamic panel estimation methods are used. The results indicate the existence of a bank lending 
channel through bank liquidity; however, while liquidity and GDP growth maintain a beneficial 
and substantial impact on bank loan growth, the other bank characteristics are not considered 
to be important factors. Additionally, there is an indication of the effect of bank risk and 
liquidity from 2008 to 2010. Nevertheless, the lending channel has been weakened, serving as 
an additional refutation of bank-specific traits in allowing banks to maintain lending activity 
and growth during a financial crisis.       
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1. Introduction 
During the evolving process of fully integrating each of its member nations, the European 
Union (EU) commenced its eastern expansion strategy by including nations from Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE). The EU officially initiated a changeover process in March 1998 which 
produced the larger Union by May 1st 2004. Substantial political and economic transformation 
have occurred in each of the ten new EU member states. CEE nations in particular have 
transitioned from a centrally-planned to a free-market structured economy (Koutsomanoli-
Filippaki et al., 2009a). Moreover, a sequence of amendments directed at the banking 
supervision structure were established in keeping with the rules of the EU regulatory system 
(Koutsomanoli-Filippaki, 2009a; 2009b). 
In light of the post-crisis credit crunch, monetary authorities and the academic world have 
experienced a resurrection of interest in evaluating the role of banks in the monetary 
transmission mechanism (MTM), especially the bank lending channel (BLC) which assumes 
that changes in monetary policy alter the supply schedules of bank loans (Bernanke and Gertler, 
1995). As stated by Matousek and Sarantis (2009) and Akinci et al. (2013) the BLC arises from 
a combination of a deposit market constraint and a binding lending constraint.  
The number of empirical studies2 that are attempting to investigate the effect of monetary 
policy shocks on bank lending activity and behaviour via the BLC is rapidly increasing; such 
papers include Kashyap and Stein (1995; 2000), Peek and Rosengren (1995), Kishan and 
Opiela (2000, 2006 and 2012), Ehrmann et al. (2003), Gambacorta (2005), Matousek and 
Sarantis (2009), Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011), Akinci, et al. (2013), Fungáčová, et 
al. (2014) and Leroy (2014) among others. Yet, having noted a gap in the existing literature, 
this paper attempts to add to the current research through concentrating on the effect of 
monetary policy specifically in the newly accessed EU states. 
Our aim in this study is to investigate the BLC of MTM by focusing on the 10 European new 
member states that joined the EU in 2004 following the agreement by the Treaty of Accession 
2003 in Athens. The aforementioned objective is consequently evaluated in further detail with 
reference to these countries: Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, hereafter EU-10.3  
                                                             
2  It must be stated here that the empirical studies conducted in the US are more conclusive than studies based in 
Europe. 
3 This paper utilises an unbalanced panel data set of banks in EU-10 nations spanning the time frame from 2004-
2013; this time selection is most appropriate for analysing the BLC since five nations were initiated into the 
European monetary union (EMU) during this period. Following this, the capability of these nations to direct 
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It is important to note that the BLC in EU-10 has not been previously tested before, although 
there have been several empirical studies that examined individual EU nations for its existence. 
However, Matousek and Sarantis (2009) is the only study that examined the BLC with 
reference to the panel of 8 CEE countries from 1994-2003. The data was sampled to take into 
account the decade following the accession, presenting the researcher with a novel benefit to 
reveal potential alterations regarding the BLC within the EU-10 compared with the seminal 
study conducted in Matousek and Sarantis (2009) which examines the decade before the 
accession.   
In this study the possibility of the BLC being molded by traditional bank characteristics (size, 
liquidity and capitalisation) as well as by risk factors is investigated. Evaluating the latter is of 
particular significance as it permits the development of a more comprehensive analysis of the 
recent financial crisis of 2007-2008. Additionally, we consider a wide selection of interaction 
terms between previously stated four bank characteristics and monetary policy with the purpose 
of ascertaining whether they affect the transmission of monetary policy in the sample 
examined. 
Conclusively, this paper contributes on the available literature through a specific focus 
on the prospective role of banking in MTM in order to reveal any clear trends in banks’ lending 
behaviour in the periods before, during and after the financial turmoil. 
This paper encounters an identification issue with respect to the disentanglement of loan supply 
from loan demand given that the BLC is only relevant to the bank lending supply. This problem 
is tackled by utilising the fundamental approach employed by Fungáčová et al. (2014) which 
accepts that all banks experience homogenous loan demand.4 Such an assumption can be 
condemned, particularly as the recent credit crunch began, which has fostered a different, novel 
approach employed by Jimenez et al. (2012) which necessitates loan level data. As a result of 
the lack of extensive loan level data for the EU-10 countries, implementation of the 
aforementioned methodology is not possible in this study. 
During the course of the investigation, the following is demonstrated: the results based upon 
inference from system GMM specification do not specify direct correlation between monetary 
policy and bank loans via the money lending channel.  
                                                             
monetary policy has been given to the ECB. As a result, these countries are largely excluded from the sample 
during the period of their accession into the EU because in a practical sense they have left the EU-10 ‘club’. 
3 Fungáčová, et al. (2014) rationalised for the problem inherent on looking at actual loans supplied (and thus 
demanded) at prevailing interest rates using Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) approach which is based on the 
assumption that every bank experiences identical loan demand and also that if bank lending variations are different 
between different types of banks, this must be a result of the different bank types changing their supplies of credit 
in dissimilar ways.  
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For this reason the theory of a direct correlation is unsubstantiated, nevertheless an indirect 
influence through the BLC is supported through bank liquidity. Similar corroborating data 
concerning the impact of bank liquidity is reported in Matousek and Sarantis (2009), Altunbas, 
et al. (2010), and Leroy (2014). Moreover, contrary to the conclusions in Matousek & Sarantis 
(2009) for 8 CEE countries, we find no evidence to support the role of bank size in EU-10 
nations. This deduction is in keeping with the literature that investigated the BLC, specifically 
in the context of banks in Western Europe (Ehrmann, et al., 2003, Altunbas et al., 2010 and 
Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011). Furthermore, the model used in this study is 
constructed to consider any distinct movement on banks’ lending behaviour for the periods 
before, during and after the financial turmoil. The results reveal that the lagged value of loan 
growth is insignificant when evaluating the sub-samples models; this offers a persuasive 
argument from the inclusion of the variable as a regressor. As a result, the model is tested via 
the fixed effect as our preferred specification for the aforementioned periods. The BLC is 
determined to have declined from 2008-2010, a conclusion derived from the fact that the 
majority of bank characteristics were ultimately determined to either not be significant or to 
have surprising negative values; these conclusions can be viewed as a further negation of the 
assumed function of such characteristics in maintaining bank lending activity and growth over 
the course of a credit crisis which evidently excludes the positive lagged value of bank’s risk 
and liquidity. 
This paper is organised as follows: Sector 2 offers an in-depth investigation of the developing 
EU-10 banking system. Section 3 presents a review of the literature on the BLC. Section 4 
explains the data and methodological framework. Section 5 discusses the empirical results, 
while section 6 concludes. 
2. A summary analysis of the financial framework in the recently accessed EU states 
Apart from Cyprus and Malta, the majority of the new EU states experienced financial reforms 
over the course of their transition on account that their banking sectors share several structural 
traits (Mamatzakis et al., 2008). These states have also seen increased domestically-sourced 
credit to the private sector during the sampled period. Yet, in spite of the aforementioned 
increase, the extent of financial intermediation in this set of countries remained below the 
average value in the EU. Furthermore, noteworthy efforts to reform were aimed at advancing 
banking sector-related legislation. 
Table 1 illustrates the fact that the majority of countries saw substantial enhancements in 
banking reform practices; this has especially been the case since 2004. The rate of interest 
liberalisation and banking reforms was comparable between the nations. Enhanced banking 
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reform practices are reflected at the financial deepening level. From 2004 to the end of period 
sampled, the average M2/GDP ratio increased from 70.8% to 91.2%. The same period also saw 
an increased rate of domestic credit to GDP from 63.8% to 93.3%.  
Table 1: Banking sector indicators5 
Note: Table 1 presents the domestic credit to the private sector (as a percentage of GDP), the M2/GDP ratio and the EBRD 
banking reform index. The EBRD banking reform measure offers a classification of advancement for liberalisation and 
institutional reform of the banking sector. The lowest value for the ranking index is 1, denoting minimal advancement in 
changing the socialist banking system and the highest rank is 4 which is characterised by changes which are in keeping with 
a market economy that is functional. Source: The World Bank, EBRD Transition Report. 
2.1 The Fraser Index of Economic Freedom and its constituents: 
The Fraser Index of Economic Freedom is made up of five elements characterised as: size of 
government: expenditures, taxes, and enterprises (GOV-Findex); legal system and property 
rights (LSP-Findex); access to sound money (SMO-Findex); freedom to trade internationally (FTI-
Findex); and regulation of credit, labour, and business (REG-Findex). The aforementioned 
components are weighted to produce a composite index t; this index is measured from 0-10 in 
order of ascending levels of economic freedom as conducted in Gwartney et al. (2014). The 
mean scores for the economies of EU-10 nations from 2004-2012 are outlined in Table 2.  
Whilst examining the regional mean values, the degree of general economic freedom (OVR-
Findex) is 7.37, a value which is lower than several of the other components of the economics 
freedom, for example access to sound money (SMO-Findex) and freedom to trade internationally 
(FTI-Findex) which yields values of 9.21 and 8.01 respectively. When analysing the sample 
taken, the data suggests that reforms corresponding to size of government (GOV-Findex) and 
legal system and property rights (LSP-Findex) occur less frequently as the regional averages for 
these indices are calculated at 5.86 and 6.56 respectively. At the domestic level, the standout 
nations with respect to the (OVR-Findex) are Estonia (7.82), Cyprus (7.66) and Slovakia (7.50); 
                                                             
5 The EBRD banking index most recent analysis of the Czech Republic is 2007 whereas Credit to private sector 
in addition to M2/GDP ratio data gathered for the Slovak Republic is limited up to 2008. 
Country Credit to the private sector 
                            
M2/GDP 
            
EBRD banking index 
                
 2004 2013 2004 2013 2004 2010 
Cyprus 208 301 171 214 na na 
Czech Republic 31 58 56 81 3.7 4* 
Estonia 61 75 58 68 4 4 
Hungary 46 52 49 63 4 3.7 
Latvia 51 61 38 43 3.7 3.7 
Lithuania 29 46 35 47 3.3 3.7 
Malta 106 119 151 171 na na 
Poland 28 55 40 60 3.3 3.7 
Slovak Republic 30 45* 57 55* 3.7 3.7 
Slovenia 48 73 53 74 3.3 3.3 
EU-10 63.8 93.3 70.8 91.2   
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the aforementioned countries produces a higher score when compared with the regional mean 
value in the majority of the main components in the overall index of economic freedom. In 
Table 3 the economic freedom variables over time in EU-10 are illustrated.  
Table 2: Progress of economic freedom in the EU-10 markets (2004-2012) 
Notes: Figures correspond to average values, ranging from 0–10. Larger values signify a more liberal economic environment. 
Source: The 2014 version of the Fraser index of economic freedom. 
 
The time frame examined in this paper reveals modest growth for the bulk of components of 
economic freedom in addition to the (OVR-Findex). Most remarkably, (LSP-Findex) shows the 
highest increase from 6.33 in 2004 to 6.56 in 2012. Yet, it is also worth mentioning that just 
(FTI-Findex) undergoes a modest reduction during the time frame sampled (see Table 3). 
Table 3: Development of economic freedom over a period in the EU-10 markets (2004-12) 
Notes: Figures correspond to average values, ranging from 0–10. Larger values signify a more liberal economic environment. 
Source: The 2014 version of the Fraser index of economic freedom. 
 
3. Literature review 
It is very challenging to determine the scale, temporal incidence and components involved in 
the reaction of the economy to significant changes in monetary policy if only the traditional 
interest-rate (neoclassical cost-of-capital) effects are considered. The credit channel and its 
endogenous mechanisms can be used in this case to bridge the gap in our understanding of 
these phenomena (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). 
Country GOV-Findex LSP-Findex SMO-Findex FTI-Findex REG-Findex OVR-Findex 
Cyprus 7.20 7.05 9.40 8.14 6.49 7.66 
Czech Republic 4.96 6.19 9.30 7.93 7.39 7.15 
Estonia 6.41 7.22 9.25 8.48 7.72 7.82 
Hungary 4.95 6.41 9.42 7.96 7.38 7.22 
Latvia 5.83 6.55 8.87 8.15 7.41 7.36 
Lithuania 6.78 6.46 8.99 7.86 7.32 7.48 
Malta 5.80 7.44 9.29 8.26 7.02 7.56 
Poland 5.49 6.03 9.33 7.39 7.04 7.05 
Slovak Republic 6.44 6.10 9.35 8.15 7.45 7.50 
Slovenia 4.71 6.16 8.87 7.75 6.81 6.86 
Average EU-10 5.86 6.56 9.21 8.01 7.20 7.37 
Year GOV-Findex LSP-Findex SMO-Findex FTI-Findex REG-Findex OVR-Findex 
2004 5.84 6.33 9.10 8.31 7.14 7.34 
2005 5.88 6.65 9.10 8.07 7.12 7.36 
2006 5.88 6.70 9.10 8.02 7.09 7.36 
2007 5.99 6.70 9.19 8.09 7.25 7.45 
2008 5.91 6.62 9.19 8.01 7.27 7.40 
2009 5.67 6.60 9.41 7.96 7.22 7.37 
2010 5.70 6.54 9.32 7.94 7.06 7.31 
2011 5.89 6.50 9.27 7.87 7.26 7.36 
2012 5.96 6.40 9.19 7.79 7.40 7.35 
Average EU-10 5.86 6.56 9.21 8.01 7.20 7.37 
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Following the influential conclusions derived from Benanke and Blinder (1988) which 
discovers the existence of a transmission channel through the credit supply, several studies 
have endeavoured to differentiate between the various channels involved in the MTM.  
A study conducted by Matousek and Sarantis (2009) highlights that during a tight monetary 
policy, a central bank indirectly forces banks to switch primarily from insured funds and 
reserves to uninsured and non-reservable sources of capital.  Accordingly, adverse-selection 
problems may occur as a result which could influence a bank’s lending position and activity 
(Stein, 1998). 
Market constraints limit the amount of debt that the bank can issue (Van Hoose, 2007). Romer 
and Romer (1990) stresses that, if necessary, banks are capable of self-financing using funding 
that is independent from deposit sources; therefore, banks are able to offset the effects of 
monetary policy constriction to their lending activity by simply offering more certificates of 
deposits (CDs). In view on that, the BLC could theoretically be ineffective if banks were 
allowed to offer unchecked amounts of CDs, or bonds immune to reserve requirements 
(Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, 2011).  
The available literature stresses three primary bank attributes which can also be considered 
gauges of balance sheet strength, that have the potential to influence the reaction of bank 
lending to a change in monetary policy; these characteristics include: bank size, capitalisation 
and liquidity. It is prudent to note at this stage that the general conclusion that can be deduced 
using the existing literature as a reference is that the studies appear to support the existence of 
a BLC in the US which operates via small banks (Kashyap and Stein, 1995), small and poorly 
capitalised banks (Kishan and Opiela, 2000), or small banks with low liquidity (Kashyap and 
Stein, 2000).  
Indeed the data from the EU Banking system is substantially less convincing than US. De Bont 
(1999) conducts an analysis of six EU nations and determines that a BLC exists in Belgium, 
Germany and the Netherlands when the short-term interest rate is essentially utilised as a 
substitute for monetary policy action. However, there is insufficient evidence to support the 
existence of a BLC in France, Italy or the UK. Altunbas et al. (2002) determines that within 
the EMU systems, banks that experience suboptimal capitalisation demonstrated a tendency to 
be more responsive to alterations in monetary policy, irrespective of size. Additionally, 
Ehrmann et al. (2003) examines micro and aggregate data, concentrating on the four biggest 
economies in the Eurozone. The study determines that banks with lower liquidity showed a 
tendency to adapt a strong reaction to changes in monetary policy than their more liquid 
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counterparts. Gambacorta (2005) analyses quarterly-derived data taken from Italian banks and 
determine that the BLC operates via poorly capitalised banks with low liquidity. An extensive 
paper by Matousek and Sarantis (2009) seeks to determine the role of banks in the monetary 
transmission mechanism and the existence of a BLC in the eight CEE nations, the study 
concludes that liquidity and size were the two most relevant bank characteristics that 
determined a bank’s response to the changes in monetary policy. 
The BLC assumes that smaller banks are more vulnerable to the issues that arise from 
information asymmetry when compared with larger banks which are able to provide certificates 
of deposits and other market instruments. Smaller banks are therefore considered to be more 
sensitive to expansionary and constrictive monetary policy shocks (Kashyap and Stein, 1995 
and 2000; Kishan and Opiela 2000). Poorly-capitalised banks are forced to decrease their loan 
supply to a greater degree when compared with well-capitalised banks, following a period of 
tight monetary policy; this ability is a result of the former’s limited capacity to access uninsured 
sources of funding (Peek and Rosengren, 1995, Kishan and Opiela, 2000 and 2006). Liquidity 
is another important bank characteristic which can be utilised to shield loan portfolios by 
decreasing their liquid assets. Consequently, banks with lower liquidity are less capable of 
protecting their loan portfolios (Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Ehrmann et al., 2003, Altunbas et 
al., 2010 and Matousek and Sarantis, 2009). These characteristics are considered to be 
positively correlated with bank loan activity. 
The 2007-08 credit turmoil served to underscore the importance of financial markets’ 
perception of risk with respect to the banks’ ability to generate funds. Furthermore, in this 
regard banks’ balance sheets have been vulnerable to credit turmoil in several respects 
(Altunbas et al., 2010).  Correspondingly, Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011) investigate 
the effect that banking strategy has on the supply of credit and the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy within the period of the financial crisis. The paper asserts that banks 
possessing a larger percentage of profitable, yet high-risk, non-interest income sources 
exercised more frugal lending to borrowers. A similar study by Kishan and Opiela (2012) 
investigates the effects of the recent credit crisis on the BLC and established risk factors 
involved in the monetary transmission mechanism. 
Following the failure of the Lehman Brothers investment bank in September 2008, Mullineux 
(2013) posits that the commencement of the global financial crises produced a greater 
tightening in bank lending, also known as the ‘Credit Cruch’. This was a result of the 
understanding that banks should ‘deleverage’ by increasing the capital to asset ratios via 
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combining reducing assets and raising new capital.   These conclusions are in keeping with 
Cohen (2013), a study that analyses a sample of 82 large international banks taken from 
advanced and emerging economies in order to identify banking lending strategies post-crisis. 
The study notes that banks which emerged from the crisis with higher capital ratios and 
increased profitability could increase their lending activity to a greater degree. 
Comparatively, Bech et al. (2012) suggests that deleveraging within a standard downturn does 
not serve to yield any substantial benefits during the recovery that follows. Alternatively, 
deleveraging under these crisis conditions had a positive, significant correlation to the 
magnitude of the following recovery. Given that highly leveraged banks are prone to distorted 
lending decisions, Adamati, et al. (2013) asserts that banks with greater capitalisation make 
comparatively wiser lending choices. Specifically, such banks are less inclined to assume 
higher risks and will be accordingly less vulnerable to issues concerning ‘debt overhang’ which 
would precludes them from making loans of high value. 
In the context of the post financial crisis period, a study by Mullineux (2013) states that banks 
endure relatively high ‘fixed costs’ when lending. As a result, they prefer to make a few larger 
loans than many smaller loans. The gaps created and left by traditional commercial banks have 
fostered a process of disintermediation in which shadow banking and other elements of the 
financial system can cover these gaps. Adamati et al. (2013) argues that this is a consequence 
of higher capital requirements which would serve to shift key activities from the regulated 
components to the shadow-banking system in which leverage is commonly even greater than 
the standard banking system.  Notably, shadow banking technology involves less capital and 
confers safety through issuing collateral to repo investors and can obtain the collateral on short 
term notice. Consequently, money derived from shadow-banking is far more likely to run when 
compared with standard bank money, which qualifies the banking model as more suited for 
investing in illiquid assets (Stein, 2014). 
4. Data and model specification 
In this analysis, annual data over the period of 2004-2013 is examined. The sample 
includes commercial, savings and co-operative banks from EU-10. Disaggregated bank data 
can be obtained from Bankscope, a commercial database maintained by International Bank 
Credit Analysis Ltd. (IBCA) and the Brussels-based Bureau van Dijk which is the primary 
source of data for European banks.  
Within the available literature, there are two commonly adopted approaches utilised for testing 
the BLC. The first is to organise banks with respect to the banks characteristics (bank size, 
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liquidity and capital).6 Such an approach requires that there be a large number of banks 
available for sampling. While this might not be an issue in countries such as the US, for 
example, other nations have relatively fewer banks that prohibit this approach. Alternatively, a 
panel data model that permits the reaction of bank lending to monetary policy shifts to be 
contingent on bank characteristics can be used, such as seen in Ehrmann et al. (2003). The 
approach used circumvents the aforementioned problem of numbers of banks using a template 
derived from Bernanke and Blinder (1988). Consequently, their methodology is employed in 
this research.  
The model used in Ehrmann et al. (2003) reveals an equation specific to bank loans, which 
considers the reaction of bank lending to monetary policy both directly via the influence of the 
money channel and indirectly by bank characteristics through the BLC. Additionally, the 
original model has been adapted in order to investigate the impact of the recent financial crises 
on the aforementioned two channels.  This is accomplished by dividing said model into three 
periods consisting of the period before (2004-2007), during (2008-2010) and after the crises 
(2011-2013). The equation given below represents the original model: 
 Model. 1 
Δ ln 𝐿𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽 Δ ln  𝐿 𝑖𝑡 − 1 + ∑ 𝛿 𝑗
1
𝑗=0
GGDP t − j + ∑ 𝜒
 1
𝑗=0
𝑗 Δ R t − j + ∑ 𝜆 𝑗 
1
𝑗=0
CPI t − j
+ ∑ 𝜃𝑘 𝑍𝑘𝑖𝑡 − 1  
4
𝑘=1
+ ∑ ∑  𝜃𝑘𝑗
1
𝑗=0
𝑍 𝑘𝑖𝑡 − 1 Δ R t − j
4
𝑘=1
+ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝜌 𝑘ℎ𝑗
1
𝑗=0
4
ℎ=𝑘+1
𝑍 𝑘𝑖𝑡 − 1 𝑍ℎ𝑖𝑡 − 1 Δ R t − j
2
𝑘=1
+  𝜀 𝑖𝑡 
where i=1,…, N is the number of banks, t=1, ….,T representing the period of inspection 
from 2004 to 2013; and,  j reflects the number of lags. L*7 denotes bank loans, R represents the 
short-term interest rates on money markets and is essentially used to reflect the monetary policy 
stance, GGDP and CPI reflect the growth rate of GDP and the inflation rate, respectively, which 
represent the demand for loan proxies. GGDP is the real growth rate-volume in constant prices 
(2005 base year) and CPI is the harmonised indices of consumer prices and is represented in a 
similar configuration as GGDP.  Additionally, ln is the natural logarithm operator, Δ is the first 
difference operator, ZK represents the K=1,2,3,4 bank characteristics variables: size (S), capital 
                                                             
6  In order to review research using the first method, consult: Altunbas (2002), Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000), 
and Kishan and Opliea (2000, 2006)  
7 Δ ln 𝐿𝑖𝑡 represents the difference of the natural logarithm of loans, i.e. the dependent variable.  
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(CAP), liquidity (LIQ) and risk (Risk). Traits which are specific to banks are denoted by t-1 
with the purpose of reducing a potential endogeneity bias. Lastly, possible fixed-effects among 
the banks were allowed for by αi and ε it indicates the error term. 
Size (S), capital (CAP), liquidity (LIQ) and risk (Risk) are bank-specific characteristics, which 
are used to assess the existence of the distributional influences of monetary policy on banks.  
S𝑖𝑡 = ln 𝐴𝑖𝑡 −
∑ ln 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑁𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑖
                                                                                                            
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 =
𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡 
−
∑
𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑁𝑖
𝑁𝑖
𝑖=1
𝑇
 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 =  
𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡
−
∑
𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑁𝑖
𝑁𝑖
𝑖=1
𝑇
  
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 =
(ROA + CAR)
(SDROA)
−  
∑
(ROA + CAR)
(SDROA)
𝑁𝑖
𝑖=1
𝑇
 
Where the size of each bank is represented by the natural logarithm of total assets (A). 
Bank capitalisation is assessed here as a ratio of total equity (CAP) to total assets, which is also 
known as the standard capital ratio, liquidity ratio is defined as cash, trading securities and 
interbank lending of maturities with less than three months to total assets; and, finally, (Risk) 
is characterised by the Z-score8 as a ratio of the total sum of return on assets and the capital 
assets ratio to standard deviation of returns on assets (see Table 4 for a descriptive analysis). 
In order to expand upon the work done in Ehrmann et al. (2003) and Gambacorta (2005), in 
our case each of the four banks characteristics must be normalised in the context of their 
average across all the banks. This is done with the purpose of producing indicators that equal 
a value of zero over all observations. Accordingly, in the previously discusses regression 
Model. 1, the average of the interaction terms (Δ R t − j 𝜕 Size it − 1, Δ R t − j 𝜕 𝐿𝑖𝑞 𝑖𝑡 − 1,
Δ R t − j 𝜕 𝐶𝑎𝑝 𝑖𝑡 − 1 and Δ R t − j 𝜕 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ) also produce a value of zero. Furthermore, 
the monetary policy effect for the average bank can be directly understood by parameters 𝜒𝑗. 
The size indicator has been normalised not only in terms of the average of the entire period of 
the sample, but also in terms of each solitary period, which eliminates undesirable trends with 
respect to size; specifically, that which could arise as a result of the premise that size is 
measured in nominal terms.  
                                                             
8 All of the sample years are used in the rolling window when computing the SDROA for each bank. 
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The following are the three primary hypotheses which can be verified utilising the equation 
outlined in Model. 1: (1) Do specific components pertaining to banks, such as size, capital, 
liquidity and risk factor, influence the loan supply? (2) Is the presence of a BLC for monetary 
policy substantiated by the data? (3) Do the periods pre-, during and post- financial crisis 
include movement on the banks’ lending behaviour?  
The first hypothesis can be tested by adopting the following reasoning: for instance, when 
examining the influence on bank lending as a consequence of a variation in bank size conveyed 
via: Δ ln 𝐿𝑖𝑡 /∆ 𝑆t-1 (in which 𝜃S is the designated coefficient for bank size in the vector 𝜃). 
Given that 𝜃S> 0, it demonstrates that large banks supply additional loans. Accordingly, 
through adopting this methodology the validity of the subsequent assumptions can be verified: 
high risk, less liquid and poorly capitalised banks are more vulnerable to provide loans in 
relation with their counterparts on the opposite side of the spectrum, i.e., low risk, highly liquid 
and well capitalised banks. 
It is suggested here that the interaction term of the bank-specific characteristics with the short-
term interest rate will serve to demonstrate the distributional effects of the monetary policy 
position.  
The second hypothesis is verified using the sub-hypotheses below: 
H1. If (∂2 Δ ln 𝐿𝑖𝑡 / ∂ Δ R t − j 𝜕 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑖𝑡 − 1) > 0 , this means that lending activity present in 
large banks is less vulnerable to monetary policy changes than that of small banks. 
H2. Banks with higher liquidity can extend credit by reducing their liquid assets supply; this 
implies that (∂2 Δ ln 𝐿𝑖𝑡 / ∂ Δ R t − j 𝜕 𝐿𝐼𝑄 𝑖𝑡 − 1) >  0. Therefore, less liquid banks must 
reduce their loan portfolio. 
H3. Banks possessing higher capitalisation are not as vulnerable to monetary policy changes, 
which suggests that (∂2 Δ ln 𝐿𝑖𝑡 / ∂ Δ R t − j 𝜕 𝐶𝐴𝑃 𝑖𝑡 − 1) >  0.  
H4. An analogous relationship exists for bank risks. This hypothesis states that low risk banks 
are less sensitive to monetary policy changes; this means (∂2 Δ ln 𝐿𝑖𝑡 / ∂ Δ R t − j 𝜕 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑖𝑡 −
1) >  0. 
Therefore, the existence of a BLC implies that the two-way interaction terms will contain 
positive coefficients in the aforementioned model, i.e, ∅𝑘𝑗> 0. 
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 H5. An additional consideration of this study
9 will examine if the following three-way 
interaction terms are important indicators of loan growth:  
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ 𝐿𝐼𝑄 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗  ∆𝑅𝑡, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ 𝐿𝐼𝑄 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗  ∆𝑅𝑡 − 1, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗
𝐶𝐴𝑃 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗  ∆𝑅𝑡, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑃 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗  ∆𝑅𝑡 − 1,   𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗  ∆𝑅𝑡,
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ ∆𝑅𝑡 − 1, 𝐿𝐼𝑄 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑃 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ ∆𝑅𝑡, 𝐿𝐼𝑄 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑃 𝑖𝑡 −
1 ∗ ∆𝑅𝑡 − 1 , 𝐿𝐼𝑄 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ ∆𝑅𝑡,   𝐿𝐼𝑄 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ ∆𝑅 𝑡 − 1,
𝐶𝐴𝑝 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ ∆𝑅𝑡,   𝐶𝐴𝑝 𝑖𝑡 − 1 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑖𝑡 − 1. 
The third test is conducted through adopting and using the same approach as outlined in the 
first and second hypotheses; thus, this can be achieved by examining the statistical significance 
specific to the coefficient found in the sub-samples specific for  the time frames pre- (2004-
2007), during (2008-2010) and post- (2011-2013) financial crises with the purpose of 
uncovering the potential role of bank-specific characteristics and possible changes to the BLC 
of monetary policy during the aforementioned phases. 
Given that EU-10 joined the EU in 2004, the sample for this study therefore spans from 2004-
2013, which should be an adequate duration of time given that an entire cycle of monetary 
policy is encompassed in this period.10 While EU-10 failed to meet the euro area entry 
requirements when their accession took place, the Treaties of Accession grants them an 
adjustment period. In other words, they are considered Member States but inclusive of a 
‘derogation’.  Evaluating the BLC during this specific time frame of this study is also crucial 
because this period saw the introduction of five nations to the Euro area. The first EU-10 nation 
to join the Eurozone was Slovenia, in 2007. Malta and Cyprus also followed suit in 2008 as 
well as Slovakia in 2009 and Estonia in 2011. Subsequently, their ability to dictate monetary 
policy has been granted to the ECB. Therefore, these nations will be omitted from the sample 
examined at the period of their accession into the euro area to a great extent since they can no 
longer really be considered to belong to the EU-10 ‘club’. Furthermore, several of the nations 
are home to a comparatively small number of total banks.11 As a result this study chooses to 
unveil the modifications to the BLC in EU-10 via pooling data, and accomplishes this through 
amending the records to a unified currency, the euro. 
                                                             
9 Note that positive coefficients on these three-way interaction terms in the presence of a BLC (i.e., 𝜌𝑘ℎ𝑗 > 0) are 
predicted using the same principles and reasoning described for two-way interaction terms (see Table 13 for a 
comprehensive synopsis of the predicted signs of coefficients). 
10 The analysed period from 2004-2013 saw a gradual trend in merger and acquisition (M&A) in all EU-10 
countries. If bank X is merged with bank Y, we treat them as one single entity from the beginning of sample 
period. 
11 Matousek and Sarantis (2009) established the existence of the BLC within Baltic estates through combining 
data sampled from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with the purpose of addressing this issue. 
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Fig. 1 shows the fact that, following 2007, the average lending growth rate in EU-10 states 
experienced a significant decline and has not since recovered. Since 2009 only volatile, 
inconsistent growth was reported with the lowest rate measured in 2013. 
 
Source: (Bankscope, 2014) 
This research utilizes the money market interest rates as the monetary policy rate. Fig. 2 
illustrates a comparative analysis of the weighted average of the changes in three month money 
market rates (∆R) in EU-10 and the Euro area. The data indicates that the central banks of the 
nations investigated fix the policy rates based on and very similar to their counterparts’ 
decisions. Moreover, nations that became members of the Euro area, including and after 2007, 
stopped announcing money market rates individually once they joined the Euro area and the 
unified interbank market within this union. 
Table 4 Descriptive statistics for the main variables  
Notes: Table 4 illustrates the primary variables employed for the regression regarding the entire representative selection over 
the period 2004-2013. Appendix I offers comparable summary statistics for the sub-samples. 
5. Estimation results 
Model.1 comprises cross-sectional fixed-effects and a lagged dependent variable. The latter 
component necessitates the utilisation of a GMM estimation procedure when examining a panel 
containing a comparatively small time-series dimension, i.e. T is at most 10 in our sample. 
Given that Model.1 also consists of a lagged dependent variable, GMM must be used in order 
                                                             
12 This consists of the money market rates on deposit with 3 months maturity. 
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Fig.1 Average lending growth rate in EU-10 states
Lending growth rate
Whole sample  Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
∆ln (Loans) Lending growth rate 873 0.141 0.347 -3.907 3.183 
Size Log of total assets 873 14.108 1.794 6.331 17.687 
Capitalisation Capital-to-asset ratio 873 0.110 0.099 0 0.987 
Liquidity Liquidity ratio 873 0.245 0.187 0 1 
Risk factor Z-score 873 21.437 24.740 -7.860 174 
GGDP  GDP growth rate 873 8.67 7.064 -5.50 17.3 
CPI Inflation rate 873 14.813 11.513 -2.96 30.92 
∆R Yearly change in the money market 
rates12 
873 -0.323 1.613 -4.178 1.392 
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to estimate it as suggested in Arellano and Bond (1991); specifically, in this case the Arellano 
and Bond two-step system estimator containing corrected coefficient standard errors from 
Windmeijer (2005) is appropriate here. The Sargan and Hansen tests are also used to investigate 
the validity of the over-identifying restrictions. Furthermore, using the Arellano and Bond test, 
the hypothesis that there is an absence of second-order correlation in the disturbance of the 
first-difference equation is assessed. When examining GMM regressions on simulated panels, 
Windmeijer (2005) determines that the two-step efficient GMM is superior to the one-step 
system, given that it allows for reduced standard errors and bias. Furthermore, Roodman (2009) 
notes that the two-step system with Windmeijer (2005) correction, yields comparatively 
accurate modelling, supporting the notion of the superiority of the two-step estimation with 
corrected standard errors approach over the robust one-step. As a result it produces a system 
consisting of two equations, the original and transformed equations, which are collectively 
termed system GMM. The combined two-step estimator holds against any number of cross-
correlation and heteroskedastic patterns that the sandwich covariance estimator represents, and 
is efficient (Roodman, 2009). 
We use the dependent variable lagged two periods and deeper “collapse GMM-style” in order 
to reduce the number of instruments and elude the chance of potentially overfitting the 
endogenous variable; this method of collapsing instruments is accompanied by a small 
reduction of efficiency. IV-style instruments are also limited to be identical for each model, 
specifically the current value and first lag of ΔRt, GGDPt and CPIt. In order to restrict the 
number of instruments to less than the number of cross-sectional units, the IV-style instrument 
does not include lags of the bank characteristics.  
By using the similar methodology adopted from Akinici et al. (2013), this study implements a 
pseudo general-to-specific model reduction approach for its GMM estimator in order to obviate 
overparameterisation that could result in collinearity issues. In addition to the current value and 
first lag of ΔRt, GGDPt and CPIt, this pseudo general model also included the first lag of Sizeit-
1, LIQit-1 and CAPit-1. Further inclusions are: the two-way interaction of the current value of ΔRt 
and the first lag of the aforementioned bank characteristic. Subsequently, this study adopts the 
general-to-specific approach by successive deletion of insignificant variables until only 
significant variables are left in the model.  Additionally, this study examines additional tests 
by including a first lag of Risk it-1, thus carrying out a wide selection of tests for the remaining 
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two and three way interaction terms in order to ascertain if these terms may be incorporated 
into the model with a degree of statistical significance.13 
The primary estimations with respect to the total period analysed are first considered and the 
results specific for before, throughout and following the financial crisis are subsequently 
compared with the purpose of elucidating the potential role of banking in monetary policy 
transmission. Significantly, any distinct movements on banks’ lending behaviour within the 
three previously addressed phases involved in the credit crisis were analysed.  
5.1 Does the data support the existence of a BLC for monetary policy in EU-10?  
Here the findings of the empirical analysis concerning the BLC of MTM within EU-10 
accession nations are outlined (see Table 5).14 As reflected in the parsimonious model, the 
growth of bank lending in response to the monetary policy stance derived from money market 
rates in the short term is not significant, i.e. the results indicate no direct correlation between 
the two via the money lending channel. Hence, the theory of a direct correlation is 
unsubstantiated, yet an indirect influence through the BLC is supported and documented below. 
The Arellano Bond test indicates the absence of second-order autocorrelation suggesting that 
the two-step system GMM estimator is reliable. p[AR(2)] represents the probability value of 
the Arellano Bond test. Furthermore, the Hansen and Sargan tests confirm the appropriate 
usage of these instruments. 
When evaluating the instances in which each bank-specific trait appears individually, only 
liquidity is determined to have a significant influence and not bank risk, capital or size. The 
statistical significance of the first lag of liquidity is ascertained at 5% suggesting a credible 
hypothesis in which more liquid banks provide loans via a reduction in liquid assets, increasing 
loans as a result. Yet, with the purpose of evaluating monetary policy and its distributional 
effects, and establishing the existence of the BLC within EU-10, the coefficients of the 
interaction terms between the traits specific to banks and the monetary policy measurements 
require investigation. The interaction terms of bank liquidity on its own with the interest rates 
are statistically significant at 10%. These finding indicate that bank liquidity is a crucial 
differentiating factor in the reaction of banks to changes in the monetary policy stance within  
                                                             
13 In addition this study conducts twelve variable tests for the three way interaction terms when approximating 
the whole sample selection via the panel fixed effect regression. 
14 Considering the dynamic presented in the levels of data, this paper outlines an analysis considering the GMM 
approximation in the whole representative sample selection, the panel fixed effect estimator may confer a small 
deviation with respect to the general results, a consequences suggested here to be a result of the variation of the 
estimation technique. 
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the investigated sample. Nevertheless, bank liquidity becomes statistically insignificant when 
entering along with other bank-specific traits. We can conclude that the remaining bank-
specific traits (bank risk, capital and size) do not seem to be crucial factors in evaluating the 
response of banks to monetary policy stance changes for the total duration of this study. 
Furthermore, the three-way interaction terms of these bank-specific attributes are evaluated 
with the purpose of determining the probability of statistically significant incorporation of these 
bank traits. Their coefficients of interaction terms are determined to be statistically insignificant 
in this case and could not be included to the model as a result. 
Table 5: Main results (GMM)                                 Table 6: Main results (Fixed effects)                                                                                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: the symbols represent the subsequent components: ∆ ln 𝐿it = yearly 
change in loans from the balance sheets of banks i, in year t, ∆Rt = yearly change 
of the short-term interest rate; Size it-1 = log of total assets; Liqit-1= liquidity 
ratio; Cap it-1= capital to asset ratio and Risk it-1= return on assets (ROA) + equity 
capital to assets ratio (CAR) divided by standard deviation of return on assets (SDROA). Coefficients for the regressors are observed along with t-ratios on 
the basis of Windmeijer corrected standard errors for the GMM method and fixed-effects estimator reported within parentheses. ?̅?2 represents the adjusted 
coefficient of determination, s denotes the regression standard error, AIC designates Akaike’s information criterion and SIC indicates Schwart’s information 
criterion. F-test is modified in order to evaluate joint significance of the slope coefficients P(F,R2=0) , as a result a Wald test estimating the joint significance 
of the slope coefficients, p(Wald). Furthermore, probability values are reported in a joint test of the exclusion restrictions necessary to attain the specific 
model through the general specification, p(restrict), in each of the estimation methods. Stata 12 was employed in order to obtain results regarding the GMM 
method through ‘Xtabond 2’ requirement as highlighted by Roodman (2009) whereas the Pooled OLS and fixed effects are both used to approximate the 
results of the models; these methods are generated via EViews 12.1. Accordingly, 15 identical instruments are utilised in our models estimated by GMM. 
The symbols ***, **, and ** indicates significance levels of a statistic at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Variable Pseudo General Specific 
∆ ln 𝐿it-1 0.141 
(0.16) 
0.120 
(2.31)* 
∆Rt  -0.0114 
(-0.09) 
 
∆Rt-1 0.0357 
(0.24) 
 
GGDPt 0.0123 
(0.47) 
0.00594 
(2.24)* 
GGDPt-1 -0.0183 
(-0.45) 
 
CPIt -0.0128 
(-0.25) 
-0.00756 
(-3.32)*** 
CPIt-1 0.0113 
(0.24) 
 
Size it-1 -0.240 
(-0.16) 
 
Size it-1×∆Rt 0.224 
(0.19) 
 
Liqit-1 -0.0181 
(-0.01) 
0.344 
(3.61)*** 
Liq it-1×∆Rt 0.0796 
(0.27) 
0.0482 
(2.32)* 
Cap it-1 0.308 
(0.05) 
 
Cap it-1×∆Rt -0.121 
(-0.12) 
 
Size it-1×∆Rt-1   
Liq it-1×∆Rt-1   
Cap it-1×∆Rt-1   
Risk it-1   
Risk it-1×∆Rt   
Risk it-1×∆Rt-1   
Size it-1×Liq it-1×∆Rt   
Size it-1× Liq it-1×∆Rt-1   
Size it-1×Cap it-1×∆Rt   
Size it-1× Cap it-1×∆Rt-1   
Size it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt   
Size it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt-1   
Liq it-1×Cap it-1×∆Rt   
Liq it-1× Cap it-1×∆Rt-1   
Liq it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt   
Liq it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt-1   
Cap it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt   
Intercept 0.263 
(0.62) 
0.168 
(3.81)*** 
p[AR(2)] 0.822 0.668 
p(Sargan) 0.619 0.26 
P(Hansen) 0.624 0.418 
p(Wald) 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Number of observations 699 699 
Number of instruments 15 15 
Variable Pseudo General Specific 
∆Rt  0.0107 
(0.73) 
 
∆Rt-1 0.0224 
(1.72) 
 
GGDPt 0.00733 
(1.45) 
0.0126 
(5.25)*** 
GGDPt-1 -0.0155 
(-2.71)** 
-0.00625 
(-2.72)** 
CPIt 0.00717 
(0.56) 
-0.00749 
(-4.31)*** 
CPIt-1 -0.00816 
(-0.75) 
 
Size it-1 -0.678 
(-9.54)*** 
-0.571 
(-10.74)*** 
Size it-1×∆Rt 0.0135 
(1.55) 
 
Size it-1×∆Rt-1 0.00679 
(0.80) 
 
Liqit-1 0.189 
(6.93)*** 
0.164 
(6.96)*** 
Liq it-1×∆Rt 0.00125 
(0.16) 
 
Liq it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.0123 
(-1.60) 
 
Cap it-1 -0.00778 
(-0.16) 
 
Cap it-1×∆Rt -0.0120 
(-1.05) 
 
Cap it-1×∆Rt-1 0.0142 
(1.04) 
 
Risk it-1 0.0673 
(0.76) 
 
Risk it-1×∆Rt -0.0100 
(-1.24) 
 
Risk it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.00695 
(-0.85) 
 
Size it-1×Liq it-1×∆Rt   
Size it-1× Liq it-1×∆Rt-1   
Size it-1×Cap it-1×∆Rt  0.00973 
(2.04)* 
Size it-1× Cap it-1×∆Rt-1   
Size it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt   
Size it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt-1   
Liq it-1×Cap it-1×∆Rt   
Liq it-1× Cap it-1×∆Rt-1   
Liq it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt   
Liq it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt-1   
Cap it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt   
Intercept 0.235 
(5.75) *** 
0.216 
(9.01)*** 
 ?̅?2 0.315 0.314 
 s 0.286 0.287 
AIC 0.545 0.517 
SIC 1.654 1.469 
P(F,R2=0) 0.000*** 0.000*** 
P(restrict) NA 0.345 
Number of observations  760 873 
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With respect to demand which is proxied by both the GDP growth (GGDP) and inflation 
(CPI), the current value of GGDP is determined to be statistically significant at 10%. 
Additionally, demand has a conceivable positive coefficient, which implies a significant impact 
on credit growth. Favourable economic conditions are conducive to expanded loan supply by 
banks. In contrast, the CPI proxy is statistically significant at 1% while also bearing a negative 
coefficient.  
A sensitivity analysis is also carried out within this study by considering three further variables 
in the original specification with the purpose of ascertaining whether the aforementioned 
variables are significant contributors to the bank credit supply; these include the tier-1 ratio, 
non-performing loans ratio (NPLs) and lastly, loan loss provisions (LLPs) as a percentage of 
gross loans. 
The inclusion of the Tier-1 ratio helps us to fully capture the capital adequacy of banks. Given 
that standard capital to asset ratio is an accounting-based indicator, it has received lots of 
criticism, most specifically during the onset of financial crises, for not capturing the risk 
tailored to the crisis. The data indicates that the role of capital is unrelated to the indicator of 
capitalisation that was used. In support of the available literature with respect to the BLC, the 
importance of the tier-1 ratio15 in a sound banking system must be acknowledged. Here it is 
suggested that the results found in this study would be inverted, in the instance that unrestricted 
access to all the bank data from the sample and period evaluated was possible. 
Additionally, this research introduces two additional accounting-based risk indicators known 
as NPLs and LLPs. NPLs show the quality of bank-held assets and the possible negative 
exposure to asset market values and earnings as a result of a decline in quality of loans, while 
LLPs are defined as a proportion of loans for an ex-post indicator of credit risk. Yet, when 
examining non-interacted and two-way interacted variables between these two risk indicators 
and the monetary policy indicator, no supporting evidence is obtained. 
However, we would expect high risk banks to restrict lending by a greater magnitude in 
comparison with low risks banks, most specifically during the recent financial crisis as 
hypothesised by Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011). 
 
 
                                                             
15 The available data on the tier-1 ratio is limited to a quarter of the total sample. 
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5.2 Sub-sample analysis and results: 
 Caution must be taken when presupposing the presence of fixed-effects and dynamics 
because such an assumption could negatively affect inference, which is in keeping with 
contemporary estimation practices presented in Akinci, et al. (2013) and Fungáčová, et al. 
(2014).  
The dynamics in the levels of data are not evident since they are not presented in their first 
differences.16 Accordingly, the model17 is tested via the panel fixed effects as our preferred 
specification while omitting the lagged dependent variable from the sub-samples model. 
Additionally, we choose to utilise the Pooled-OLS estimator with the purpose of ascertaining 
and verifying the reliability of the results obtained.  
Included in the general specification are the following: the lagged values of the four bank 
characteristics as well as that of each of the two macroeconomic variables, and finally a 
selection of two-way and three-way interaction terms specific for interest rate changes and 
bank-specific variables. The parsimonious models are presented in Table 7 & 8 are effective 
interpretations of the general models and it can be understood that the limitations set for general 
models in order to acquire the parsimonious models are not subject to rejection (refer to 
p(restrict)). Moreover, these models offer substantial explanatory power in which p(F, R2=0) 
represents the probability value of the F-test for the null R2=0.  
As reflected in the model tailored for the pre-crises sample (2004-2007), our results 
make a moderate case for the existence of the BLC within the EU-10 states. Specifically, 
monetary-policy interaction terms for liquidity is ascertained at 10%.18 While the first lag of 
liquidity is significant at 5%, the first lag of size is significant at 1% and bears a negative 
coefficient which could support the argument that smaller banks could have more variable 
lending activity if newly founded, relative to the larger banks. Using the Pooled-OLS 
methodology in order to check the legitimacy of the results acquired this additionally supports 
                                                             
16 Given that annual data as opposed to quarterly data is utilised here, the outcome is actually not unexpected. 
When considering that Fungáčová, et al. (2014) underlines the idea that a convincing argument can be made 
regarding the reason why lending in the previous quarter could affect contemporary lending, the study also 
suggests that it would be more difficult to find an economic justification that explains why the previous year’s 
lending should affect the present year’s lending; this is consistent with the evaluation of Turkish monetary policy 
seen in Akinci et al. (2013). 
17 In this methodology time period fixed-effects cannot be included since macroeconomic variables only show 
changes in time instead of being spread across banks; therefore, they would be flawlessly collinear with period 
effects 
18 This result is calculated using the general model. Both general and specific models calculated by the Pooled-
OLS support this conclusion. 
 19 
 
the premise the three-way interaction terms of ∆R t-1 with lagged size and liquidity, and lagged 
liquidity and capital are both statistically significant at 1%. These results highlight the 
significance of the previously mentioned interaction terms by facilitating banks in terms of 
loans issued as well as their resistance to changes in monetary policy, specifically for the period 
before the financial crisis. 
Table 7: Pre-crisis results                             Table 8: Pre-crisis results 
                        Pooled-OLS estimator:                                               Panel fixed effects regression: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Indicates significance of a statistic at the 10% level. 
** Indicates significance of a statistic at the 5% level. 
***Indicates significance of a statistic at the 1% level. 
In keeping with the deductions and inferences made in the available theoretical models about 
the BLC, the impact of bank size, liquidity, capital and risk on bank-sourced lending should 
conceivably bear positive coefficients; this means that large, highly liquid banks, well-
capitalised and low risk banks should less likely to change their credit portfolio, especially in 
the instance of a banking crisis and consequently to monetary policy stance changes. Yet, as 
our model tailored for the crisis (2008-2010) implies, said coefficients are ultimately not 
significant; this conclusion serves as an additional refutation of the role of said indicators in 
allowing banks to maintain lending activity and growth during a financial crisis, which 
apparently does not include the positive lagged value of risk and liquidity. The data reveals that 
Variable General Specific 
∆Rt-1 -5.732 
(-0.09) 
 
Size it-1 -0.0478 
(-1.90) 
 
Liquidity it-1 0.00494 
(0.20) 
 
Capitalisation it-1 -0.0415 
(-1.12) 
 
Risk it-1 0.00713 
(0.29) 
 
Size it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.0106 
(-0.33) 
 
Liq it-1×∆Rt-1 0.0772 
(2.36)* 
0.0781  
(2.72)** 
Cap it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.0164 
(-0.31) 
 
Risk it-1×∆Rt-1 0.0131 
(0.36) 
 
Size it-1×Liq it-1×∆Rt-1 0.150 
(4.39)*** 
0.155 
(5.32)*** 
Size it-1×Cap it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.0164 
(-0.42) 
 
Size it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt-1 0.000925 
(0.03) 
 
Liq it-1×Cap it-1×∆Rt-1 0.182 
(3.28)** 
0.170 
 (3.60)*** 
Liq it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.0169 
(-0.51) 
 
Cap it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt-1 0.00129 
(0.05) 
 
GGDPt-1 1.298 
(0.09) 
 
Intercept -5.950 
(-0.09) 
0.260 
(13.02)*** 
 ?̅?2 0.081 0.107 
s 0.306 0.301 
AIC 0.541 0.455 
SIC 0.795 0.514 
P(F,R2=0) 0.000*** 0.000*** 
P(restrict) NA 0.923 
Number of observations  230 231 
Variable  General Specific 
∆Rt-1 -1.644 
(-0.04) 
 
Size it-1 -1.291 
(-7.76)*** 
-0.731 
(-6.65)*** 
Liquidity it-1 0.204 
(2.66)** 
0.119 
(2.61)** 
Capitalisation it-1 0.0132 
(0.08) 
 
Risk it-1 0.189 
(0.89) 
 
Size it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.0164 
(-0.67) 
 
Liq it-1×∆Rt-1 0.0580 
(2.24)* 
 
Cap it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.0754 
(-1.94) 
 
Risk it-1×∆Rt-1 0.0518 
(1.76) 
 
Size it-1×Liq it-1×∆Rt-1 0.0470 
(1.45) 
 
Size it-1×Cap it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.0504 
(-1.63) 
 
Size it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt-1 0.00456 
(0.16) 
 
Liq it-1×Cap it-1×∆Rt-1 0.0977 
(1.87) 
 
Liq it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.00242 
(-0.09) 
 
Cap it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.0153 
(-0.72) 
 
GGDPt-1 0.377 
(0.04) 
 
Intercept -1.505 
(-0.03) 
0.264 
(15.83)*** 
 ?̅?2 0.613 0.358 
S 0.198 0.255 
AIC 0.127 0.390 
SIC 1.91365 2.025 
P(F,R2=0) 0.000*** 0.000*** 
P(restrict) NA 0.3642 
Number of observations  230 339 
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less risk and highly liquid bank are not disposed to decrease their lending activity relative to 
the opposite side of the spectrum.  
Yet there is no data to indicate the existence of the BLC within the period of the crisis. The 
result obtained via the three-way interaction terms of ∆R t-1 with lagged size and liquidity is 
significant at 10%; however it carries a negative coefficient which is inconsistent with the BLC 
hypothesis and cannot be utilised to determine whether the channel exists; this reasoning also 
applies to monetary policy interaction terms for both risk and liquidity. For the most part this 
conclusion is well supported and consistent irrespective of estimation methodologies employed 
they suggest that the BLC stayed impaired and decreased in effectiveness particularly within 
the crisis sample. Lastly, varied economic activity, by GDP growth, is also observed to be 
positively correlated with loan growth. 
              Table 9: Crisis results                                 Table 10: Crisis results 
                  Pooled-OLS estimator:                                              Panel fixed effects regression: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Indicates significance of a statistic at the 10% level. 
** Indicates significance of a statistic at the 5% level. 
***Indicates significance of a statistic at the 1% level. 
The post-crisis sample (2011-2013) indicates a substantial measure of evidence to support the 
existence of the BLC; this is given through the three-way interaction terms represented in ∆R 
t-1 with lagged size and liquidity. Additionally, it is observed that well-capitalised and highly 
liquid banks realised more loan growth following the crisis. Furthermore, the monetary policy 
Variable General Specific 
∆Rt-1 -0.0730 
(-0.47) 
 
Size it-1 -0.0889 
(-1.16) 
 
Liquidity it-1 0.0926 
(1.35) 
 
Capitalisation it-1 0.152 
(1.49) 
0.116 
(4.86)*** 
Risk it-1 0.208 
(2.70)** 
0.199 
(2.77 )** 
Size it-1×∆Rt-1 0.0286 
(0.39) 
 
Liq it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.109 
(-1.66) 
 
Cap it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.164 
(-1.37) 
 
Risk it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.167 
(-2.14)* 
-0.188 
(-2.60)** 
Size it-1×Liq it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.125 
(-4.10)*** 
-0.111 
(-6.59)*** 
Size it-1×Cap it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.0549  
(-1.62) 
 
Size it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt-1 0.0431 
(1.78) 
 
Liq it-1×Cap it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.000325 
(-0.01) 
 
Liq it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt-1 0.0169 
(0.71) 
 
Cap it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt-1 0.0350 
(1.24) 
 
GGDPt-1 0.0127 
(1.59) 
0.0118 
(3.92)*** 
Intercept -0.0118 
(-0.13) 
-0.0437 
(-1.30) 
 ?̅?2 0.308 0.290 
s 0.266 0.268 
AIC 0.247 0.233 
SIC 0.473 0.312 
P(F,R2=0) 0.000*** 0.000*** 
P(restrict) NA 0.0989 
Number of observations  271 271 
Variable  General Specific 
∆Rt-1 -0.0475 
(-0.24) 
 
Size it-1 -0.387 
(-1.84) 
-0.327 
(-2.69)** 
Liquidity it-1 0.377 
(4.41)*** 
0.406 
(4.97)*** 
Capitalisation it-1 0.231 
(1.15) 
 
Risk it-1 0.393 
(1.65) 
0.413 
(2.76)** 
Size it-1×∆Rt-1 0.0108 
(0.13) 
 
Liq it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.140 
(-2.00)* 
-0.182 
(-2.84)** 
Cap it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.209 
(-1.03) 
 
Risk it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.266 
(-2.92)** 
-0.292 
(-3.63)*** 
Size it-1×Liq it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.115 
(-1.90) 
-0.0857 
(-2.29)* 
Size it-1×Cap it-1×∆Rt-1 0.0239 
(0.28) 
 
Size it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.0634 
(-0.80) 
 
Liq it-1×Cap it-1×∆Rt-1 0.0373 
(0.36) 
 
Liq it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt-1 0.00881 
(0.12) 
 
Cap it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.273 
(-1.83) 
 
GGDPt-1 0.00848 
(0.94) 
0.00649 
(2.16)* 
Intercept 0.139 
(1.17) 
0.0682 
(1.69) 
 ?̅?2 0.493 0.490 
S 0.227 0.228 
AIC 0.182 0.184 
SIC 1.963 1.846 
P(F,R2=0) 0.000*** 0.000*** 
P(restrict) NA 0.377 
Number of observations  271 271 
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interaction term for capital has a favourable positive coefficient. As reflected in the 
parsimonious model by the Pooled-OLS, the general reproducibility and reliability of the 
results following the crisis should be accepted; yet, it supports a negative coefficient for the 
three-way interaction terms represented in ∆R t-1 with lagged liquidity and capital which is in 
contrast with the results produced via the Panel fixed effect estimator. As a result this small 
discrepancy will not be addressed in this analysis. 
                  Table 11 Post-crisis results                    Table 12 Post-crisis results 
                       Pooled-OLS estimator:                                         Panel fixed effects regression: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Indicates significance of a statistic at the 10% level. 
** Indicates significance of a statistic at the 5% level. 
***Indicates significance of a statistic at the 1% level. 
5.3 Discussion of results: 
Similar to the previous empirical  research conducted by Matousek & Saranatis (2009) which 
examined the BLC with reference to the panel of 8 CEE countries from 1994-2003, we find 
liquidly to be an important factor in assessing a bank’s ability to provide credits. Furthermore, 
the existence of the BLC is demonstrated via liquidity which appears to be a significant, 
contributing bank-specific characteristic when evaluating the banks’ response to monetary 
policy changes. Comparable supporting evidence for the influence of bank liquidity is 
Variable General Specific 
∆Rt-1 0.0543 
(3.47)*** 
0.0195 
(2.41)* 
Size it-1 -0.0260 
(-1.00) 
 
Liquidity it-1 0.0405 
(1.87) 
0.0403 
(2.37)* 
Capitalisation it-1 0.150 
(3.82)*** 
0.165 
(4.24)*** 
Risk it-1 0.0355 
(1.41) 
 
Size it-1×∆Rt-1 0.00659 
(0.59) 
 
Liq it-1×∆Rt-1 0.0148 
(1.46) 
 
Cap it-1×∆Rt-1 0.0525 
(2.83)** 
0.0384 
(2.63) ** 
Risk it-1×∆Rt-1 0.0130 
(0.95) 
 
Size it-1×Liq it-1×∆Rt-1 0.0227 
(2.06)* 
 
Size it-1×Cap it-1×∆Rt-1 0.0168 
(1.15) 
 
Size it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.0156 
(-1.68) 
-0.0184 
(-2.31)* 
Liq it-1×Cap it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.00810 
(-0.51) 
-0.0348 
(-3.69)*** 
Liq it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt-1 0.0250 
(1.75) 
0.0247 
(3.19)** 
Cap it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt-1 0.0129 
(0.60) 
 
GGDPt-1 -0.0422 
(-1.89) 
 
Intercept 0.695 
(2.12)* 
0.0744 
(3.47)*** 
 ?̅?2 0.254 0.226 
s 0.241 0.246 
AIC 0.0741 0.0719 
SIC 0.336 0.195 
P(F,R2=0) 0.000*** 0.000*** 
P(restrict) NA 0.144 
Number of observations  220 220 
Variable  General Specific 
∆Rt-1 0.0224 
(2.22)* 
0.0138 
(2.77)** 
Size it-1 -0.232 
(-1.35) 
 
Liquidity it-1 0.243 
(5.88)*** 
0.229 
(6.09)*** 
Capitalisation it-1 0.335 
(5.81)*** 
0.297 
(6.59)*** 
Risk it-1 -0.0764 
(-0.45) 
 
Size it-1×∆Rt-1 0.00133 
(0.18) 
 
Liq it-1×∆Rt-1 0.0120 
(1.71) 
 
Cap it-1×∆Rt-1 0.0235 
(1.81) 
0.0371 
(3.95)*** 
Risk it-1×∆Rt-1 0.00897 
(0.99) 
 
Size it-1×Liq it-1×∆Rt-1 0.0154 
(1.90) 
0.0144 
(2.74)** 
Size it-1×Cap it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.0188 
(-1.48) 
 
Size it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt-1 0.00921 
(1.16) 
 
Liq it-1×Cap it-1×∆Rt-1 0.0157 
(1.18) 
0.0267 
(2.96)** 
Liq it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt-1 0.00527 
(0.50) 
 
Cap it-1×Risk it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.00412 
(-0.20) 
 
GGDPt-1 -0.0170 
(-1.11) 
 
Intercept 0.378 
(1.64) 
0.113 
(8.47)*** 
 ?̅?2 0.767 0.770 
S 0.135 0.134 
AIC -0.862 -0.872 
SIC 0.942 0.777 
P(F,R2=0) 0.000*** 0.000*** 
P(restrict) NA 0.572 
Number of observations  220 220 
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documented in Ehrmann, et al. (2003), Gambacorta (2005), Altunbas, et al. (2010), and Leroy 
(2014), among others. 
Additionally, this assessment upholds previous study by Matousek & Saranatis (2009) which 
suggests that the effect of bank capital on the banks’ reaction to monetary policy variation is 
less important; therefore, capitalisation is not considered a strong contributing factor when 
assessing the likelihood of a bank’s reaction to changes in monetary policy. With respect to the 
CEE nations, the results here are in contrast to earlier investigations that obtained results 
supporting the influence of capitalisation in the Czech Republic (Pruteanu, 2004) and Poland 
(Wróbel and Pawlowska, 2002).   
In contrast to the findings in Matousek & Sarantis (2009) for 8 CEE countries, Horváth et al. 
(2006) for Hungary, Pruteanu (2004) for the Czech Republic, and Wróbel and Pawlowska 
(2002) for Poland, we find no evidence to support the role of bank size in EU-10 countries.  
This conclusion is in line with studies that examined the BLC with reference to Western 
European banks (Ehrmann, et al., 2003, Altunbas, et al., 2002, Gambacorta, 2005, Altunbas et 
al., 2010 and Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011), see among others. 
Finally, when examining the total sample, there is little evidence to substantiate the role of 
bank risk; yet high risk banks would be expected to limit lending to a greater extent than low 
risk banks, specifically during the crisis period examined. This is in keeping with the 
postulation made by Altunbas, et al., (2010) and Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011). 
The monetary policy makers reacted to the GFC by slashing interest rates to nearly zero and 
keeping them there for a record duration of time with the purpose of enabling bank lending 
activity. Under these circumstances Keynes (1936) characterised monetary policy as similar to 
‘pushing and string’ while also presenting the idea of a ‘liquidity trap’. With the intention of 
increasing the rate of economic recovery, the central banks have introduced a several 
unconventional monetary policy practices coined “non-standard policy measures, 
“quantitative easing” and “credit easing”. When examining the aim of the ECB, Cour-
Thimann and Winkler (2013) highlights that the central bank employs non-standard measures 
that act as a complement to the standard interest rate policy rather than as a replacement for it. 
Such measures have served to enhance credit flows and financing conditions because they are 
geared at assisting the effective diffusion of interest rate policies throughout the euro area at a 
time when other policies and developments have proved ineffective in several areas of Europe’s 
financial sector. As stressed in Mullineux (2013), the central banks’ practice of offering an 
elastic supply of liquidity could therefore be similar to ‘pushing on a string’; yet, in order to 
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sufficiently stimulate the economy, banks need to begin lending idle cash to investment firms 
utilising this capital.  
As reflected in the model specific for during and after crisis, the growth of bank lending in 
response to the monetary policy stance derived from money market rates in the short term is 
not significant yet again. Considering substantially reduced monetary policy rates within the 
crisis period, an inverse correlation between interest rates and bank lending growth would be 
predicted; yet, this hypothesis is unsupported by the estimated data. In contrast to the 
theoretical justification for the money channel, which endorses a concept of an indirect 
relationship between bank lending growth and monetary policy stance, in the model that 
evaluates the period following the crisis it is suggested that an unanticipated positive relation 
exists possibly a consequence of a ‘pushing on a string effect’. 
What this really highlights is that notwithstanding the labours of the national central banks to 
keep interest rates low and inject liquidity into their economic systems, bank lending has stayed 
subdued. This result can be correlated with that seen when examining the critical investigation 
of the Japanese economy in Werner (2012) which highlights that continuous interest rate 
reductions for a period spanning over a decade were unsuccessful at stimulating the economy 
and expanding the money supply.Additionally, the model tailored for the crisis confirms that 
low risk banks are not disposed to decrease their lending activity relative to the opposite side 
of the spectrum. Altunbas, et al., (2010) and Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011) similarly 
provide evidence for the influence of bank risk in this case. 
The data suggests that well-capitalised and highly liquid banks are able to increase their lending 
activity particularly in the post financial crisis time frame, highlighting the important role that 
these bank-specific characteristics have during this period. High liquidity or high capitalisation 
better facilitates bank lending prospects while avoiding statutory limitations (Leroy, 2014). 
The estimations made here indicate that the prevalence of BLC was reduced throughout the 
credit crisis. The influence of the financial crisis is thought to have been more distinct for the 
credit supply than for the credit demand. Here it is suggested that the effectiveness of monetary 
policy has been reduced during this period for a variety of reasons, such as bank aversion to 
increase lending activity and volume irrespective of the monetary policy stance.  
In addition, this study also assesses unconventional monetary policy by introducing a further 
proxy corresponding the ratio between each central bank’s total assets and nominal GDP forthe 
post crisis sample.19 The previously addressed proxy suggests a similar effect as these measures 
                                                             
19 The data for constructing this proxy were taken from Bankscope and Eurostat which consists of the following 
central banks: Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and Poland. 
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seem to be ineffective in covering reduced lending activity by banks following the aftermath 
of financial turmoil.20 
The ultimate robustness check includes assessing the possible effect that other nations’ factors 
could have on the results at the bank level. Stated in other terms, this study determines whether 
solitary bank coefficients may vary in different nations when controls for nation-specific 
macroeconomic or financial elements are present.21Thus a simplified version of model.1 is 
estimated again utilising the panel fixed estimator, by examining nations that stay in the EU-
10 but had not joined the EMU before 2013 with reference to full period of sample including 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Baltic states and Poland (Estonia was later left out in 2011) in 
addition to the new EMU countries comprising Slovenia, Slovakia, Cyprus and Malta, prior to 
the date they adopted the euro as their own currency.  The outcomes documented in Appendix. 
II indicated for the most part that the coefficients were not significantly different for national 
banks in Europe and the deduction resulting from this research. As a result the primary 
conclusions remain intact. 
6. Conclusion  
This paper explores the role of the banks with respect to the monetary transmission mechanism; 
specifically by examining the 10 accession countries which became members of the EU in 
accordance with the pact stated in the Treaty of Accession from 2004 to 2013. This is in contrast 
to prior research by Matousek and Sarantis (2009) which used a reference panel of 8 CEE 
countries, covering the decade preceding the accession (1994-2003). The data indicates that 
the BLC has experience an evolved development over the period in EU-10, considering the 
time frame in this research. The existence of the BLC is demonstrated via liquidity which 
appears to be a significant, contributing bank-specific characteristic when evaluating the banks’ 
response to monetary policy changes. Furthermore, the coefficient on bank size is determined 
to be statistically insignificant for EU-10. Therefore, the matter of informational asymmetry is 
not vital in the BLC for EU-10. It is determined that the remaining bank-specific traits (bank 
risk and capital) appear to be irrelevant considerations when evaluating the response of banks 
to changes in monetary policy for the total duration of this study. 
                                                             
20 The ratio has a predicted negative sign when included in the parsimonious model specific for the post-crisis 
sample, which is in contrast to a recent study conducted in Fungáčová, et al. (2014) and Gambacorta and Marques-
Ibanez (2011) in which the direct positive relation was determined for the Euro area and more industrialised 
countries. 
21The exceptions we make here is by pooling the three Baltic countries, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia due to small 
number of banks in these countries in line with Matousek and Sarantis (2009) study. in addition to the data for 
(Slovenia and Slovakia) and (Cyprus and Malta) 
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The model used in this study is constructed to consider any distinct movement on banks’ 
lending behaviour for the periods before, during and after the financial turmoil. Revealing the 
fact that bank characteristics can change the strength of the BLC during the previously stated 
three phases. From 2008 to 2010, there is data to support the impact of bank risk and liquidity; 
however this channel is impaired, which serving as an additional refutation of the role of said 
indicators in allowing banks to maintain lending activity and growth during a financial crisis. 
This paper proposes that the effectiveness of monetary policy has been reduced throughout the 
credit crisis for different reasons, such as bank aversion to increase lending activity and volume 
irrespective of the monetary policy stance.  
Moreover, this study supports the introduction of regulatory capital requirements and suggests 
that this would not cause reduced lending. Highly liquid, well-capitalised banks demonstrated 
reduced vulnerability in response to the influence of monetary policy in the period following 
the financial crisis that was sampled. Accordingly, it is advised that banks fulfil the standards 
set by these regulations and requirements. In addition, the shadow banking system must also 
be monitored as a result of more potentially dangerous components native to this system, 
reinforcing the idea of having regulation procedures that are a good fit with its complementary 
financial institution. This research recommends widespread data availability on the entire 
banking system, including more detail. Measurement by tier-1 capital ratio would be 
particularly useful as it would permit subsequent research to perform a detailed evaluation of 
the monetary policy transmission mechanism since it considers additional parameters. 
Our results reveal that the lagged value of loan growth is insignificant when evaluating the sub-
samples models using the Arellano and Bond GMM methodology; this offers a persuasive 
argument from the inclusion of the variable as a regressor. As a result, the model is tested via 
the fixed effect model as our preferred specification for the aforementioned periods. 
Consequently, future research ought to consider this issue, given that incorrect postulations 
regarding dynamics represented in the evidence could negatively impact inference. 
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Appendix I. Data appendix 
Country repartition 
Country Cyprus Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland Slovakia Slovenia 
Number of 
Banks 15 20 8 26 20 11 9 43 14 16 
Number of 
observations 34 126 31 144 140 77 15 243 39 24 
 
Before crisis (2004-07) Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
∆ln (Loans) 339 0.2714 0.318 -1.674 3.183 
Size 339 13.993 1.679 8.958 17.371 
Capitalisation 339 0.110 0.093 0 0.928 
Liquidity 339 0.271 0.184 0 1 
Risk factor 339 21.928 25.574 0.172 174 
GDP (growth rate) 339 3.75 7.267 -5.50 13.9 
∆R 339 0.247 1.018 -1.084 1.392 
 
During crisis (2008-10) Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
∆ln (Loans) 273 .0771 0.99 -3.907 2.927 
Size 273 14.145 1.778 6.331 17.577 
Capitalisation 273 0.111 0.110 0 0.987 
Liquidity 273 0.204 0.164 0 0.978 
Risk factor 273 20.093 22.675 -4.493 151.66 
GDP (growth rate) 273 9.67 5.458 4.9 17.3 
∆R 273 -0.853 2.354 -4.178 0.8938 
 
Post crisis (2011-13) Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
∆ln (Loans) 220 0.043 0.280 -1.307 1.762 
Size 220 14.280 1.7645 7.198 17.687 
Capitalisation 220 0.110 0.107 0 0.933 
Liquidity 220 0.210 0.194 0 1 
Risk factor 220 21.450 25.034 -7.860 157.408 
GDP (growth rate) 220 14.20 1.595 12.3 16.2 
∆R 220 -0.364 0.791 -1.482 0.2 
 
Fig. 2 
Money market interest rates, deposit liabilities, 3 months (80-100 days maturity) annual frequency: 
 
           Source: (ECB, Eurostat, OECD and Central Banks)
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22 The hypothetical foundation of the assertion stated in this segment is sourced from empirically supported research (Gambacorta, 2005; Matousek & Sarantis, 2009; Altunbas, et al. 2010; 
Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, 2011 and Akinci et al. 2013, among others). 
Table: 13 
Variable Expected 
sing 
Hypothetical Outlook 22 Regression results based on 
Model.1 
Sizeit-1 +/- Large banks may be less vulnerable to dramatic changes in monetary policy (+). Smaller banks could have more variable lending activity if newly founded, relative to the larger banks. 
Additionally, a healthy lending relationship between small banks and firms could be a possibility (-) 
 
Sizeit-1*C +/- Too big to fail (+) / Too big to be bailed out (-) -- 
CAPit-1 + Banks that are well-capitalised banks tend to increase the loan supply   
CAPit-1*C + Especially during the period of the financial crisis   
LIQit-1 + Banks with higher liquidity are expected to increase their loan supply ++ 
LIQit-1*C + Especially during the period of the financial crisis  +++ 
Riskit-1 +/- Bank loan portfolios that are low risk are not as vulnerable if mandated by regulation from capital markets (+) 
Banks with higher risk could increase their lending activity (-) 
 
Riskit-1*C + During the period of the financial crisis, banks with less risk are not particularly disposed to decrease their lending activity relative to the opposite side of the spectrum ++ 
∆𝑅t - Tight monetary policy results in decreased lending activity (-)  
∆𝑅t*C +/- During the period of the financial crisis a “pushing on a string effect” could occur (+); this effect could be augmented (-)  
GGDPt + Favourable economic conditions are conducive to expanded loan supply by banks + 
GGDPt*C + Especially during the period of the financial crisis   
CPIt +/- Inflation levels could have a favourable impact on the growth of nominal loans (+). Inflation rates could have the opposite effect on these loans (-) --- 
The bank lending channel (BLC) postulation: 
The 2-way and 3-way interaction between bank characteristics and the monetary policy measurement 
 
Sizeit-1∗ ∆Rt 
Sizeit-1∗ ∆Rt *C 
+ 
+ 
Larger banks are predicted to resist the changes in monetary policy 
Especially during the period of the financial crisis  
 
CAPit-1∗ ∆Rt 
CAPit-1∗ ∆Rt *C 
+ 
+ 
Well-capitalised banks are predicted to resist the changes in monetary policy 
Especially during the period of the financial crisis  
 
LIQit-1∗ ∆Rt 
LIQit-1∗ ∆Rt *C 
+ 
+ 
Highly liquid banks are predicted to resist the changes in monetary policy 
Especially during the period of the financial crisis  
-- 
Riskit-1∗ ∆Rt 
Riskit-1∗ ∆Rt *C 
+ 
+ 
low risk banks are less sensitive to monetary policy changes 
Especially during the period of the financial crisis 
--- 
Sizeit-1* CAPit-1∗ ∆Rt 
Sizeit-1* CAPit-1∗ ∆Rt*C 
+ 
+ 
Large banks that are well-capitalised are predicted to resist the changes in monetary policy 
Especially during the period of the financial crisis  
 
Sizeit-1* LIQit-1∗ ∆Rt 
Sizeit-1*LIQit-1∗ ∆Rt*C 
+ 
+ 
Large banks with high liquidity are predicted to resist the changes in monetary policy 
Especially during the period of the financial crisis        
- 
Sizeit-1* Riskit-1∗ ∆Rt 
Sizeit-1*Riskit-1∗ ∆Rt*C 
+ 
+ 
Large banks with low risk are less sensitive to monetary policy changes 
Especially during the period of the financial crisis  
 
CAPit-1* LIQit-1∗ ∆Rt 
CAPit-1* LIQit-1∗ ∆Rt*C 
+ 
+ 
Banks with high liquidity that are well-capitalised  are predicted to resist the changes in monetary policy 
Especially during the period of the financial crisis  
 
CAPit-1* RISKit-1∗ ∆Rt 
CAPit-1* RISKit-1∗ ∆Rt*C 
+ 
+ 
Well capitalised and low risk banks are less sensitive to monetary policy changes 
Especially during the period of the financial crisis  
 
LIQit-1* RISKit-1∗ ∆Rt 
LIQit-1* RISKit-1∗ ∆Rt*C 
+ 
+ 
Liquid and low risk banks are less sensitive to monetary policy changes 
Especially during the period of the financial crisis  
 
 
Notes: The sample for this study spans from 2004 to 2013. The signs + (-), ++ (--), +++ (---) indicate significance of a statistic at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, correspondingly. C denotes the period of financial crisis. 
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Appendix. II: Robustness check (Estimates of Model.1 using bank data): 
Table 14A (Estimates of Model.1 using bank data. Czech Republic). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Indicates significance at 10%. 
** Idem, 5%. 
*** Idem, 1%. 
 Size Liq Cap Risk Size Liq Size Cap Size Risk Liq Cap Liq Risk Cap Risk 
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
∆Rt-1 -0.043 
(0.78) 
-0.016 
(0.21) 
0.014 
(0.18) 
-0.012 
(0.16) 
-0.081 
(1.31) 
-0.081 
(1.49) 
-0.058 
(1.10) 
-0.031 
(0.39) 
-0.027 
(0.36) 
0.024 
(0.31) 
GGDPt-1 0.022 
(1.51) 
0.001 
(0.06) 
-0.015 
(0.74) 
-0.009 
(0.46) 
0.032 
(2.09)* 
0.026 
(1.85) 
0.022 
(1.60) 
-0.002 
(0.08) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
-0.011 
(0.56) 
CPIt-1 -0.021 
(1.87) 
-0.017 
(1.05) 
-0.003 
(0.21) 
-0.005 
(0.31) 
-0.028 
(2.45)* 
-0.021 
(1.96) 
-0.018 
(1.74) 
-0.013 
(0.77) 
-0.013 
(0.80) 
-0.002 
(0.10) 
Size it-1 -0.945 
(10.38)*** 
   -0.933 
(10.00)*** 
-0.975 
(11.31)*** 
-0.879 
(10.05)*** 
   
Liquidity it-1  0.249 
(2.73)** 
  0.141 
(2.12)* 
  0.209 
(2.18)* 
0.151 
(1.60) 
 
Capitalisation it-1   -0.221 
(0.98) 
  -0.763 
(3.82)*** 
 -0.483 
(1.48) 
 0.301 
(1.19) 
Risk it-1    -0.514 
(3.79)*** 
  -0.393 
(4.10)*** 
 -0.423 
(2.82)** 
-0.686 
(4.14)*** 
Size it-1×∆Rt-1 0.069 
(1.46) 
   0.071 
(1.32) 
0.119 
(2.31)* 
0.095 
(1.97) 
   
Liq it-1×∆Rt-1  -0.118 
(1.70) 
  -0.043 
(0.70) 
  -0.143 
(1.90) 
-0.104 
(1.40) 
 
Cap it-1×∆Rt-1   -0.122 
(1.13) 
  0.040 
(0.41) 
 -0.001 
(0.08) 
 0.0508 
(0.39) 
Risk it-1×∆Rt-1  
 
 0.0420 
(0.64) 
  0.002 
(0.04) 
 0.053 
(0.62) 
0.026 
(0.34) 
Size it-1× Liq it-1×∆Rt-1  
 
  -0.053 
(0.96) 
     
Size it-1× Cap it-1×∆Rt-1  
 
   0.112 
(2.46)* 
    
Size it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt-1       -0.04 
(0.69) 
   
Liq it-1× Cap it-1×∆Rt-1        -0.110 
(1.28) 
  
Liq it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt-1         0.069 
(0.76) 
 
Cap it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt-1          -0.06 
(0.33) 
Constant -0.0143 
(0.02) 
1.816 
(1.61) 
2.173 
(1.86) 
1.644 
(1.48) 
-0.242 
(0.29) 
-0.494 
(0.62) 
-0.298 
(0.38) 
1.641 
(1.44) 
1.436 
(1.31) 
1.545 
(1.40) 
R-squared   0.540 0.123 0.048 0.161 0.564 0.605 0.608 0.143 0.210 0.199 
Observations 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 
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Table 14B (Estimates of Model.1 using bank data. Poland). 
* Indicates significance at 10%. 
** Idem, 5%. 
*** Idem, 1%. 
 Size Liq Cap Risk Size Liq Size Cap Size Risk Liq Cap Liq Risk Cap Risk 
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
∆Rt-1 -0.032 
(1.50) 
-0.006 
(0.29) 
-0.004 
(0.18) 
-0.005 
(0.22) 
-0.032 
(1.49) 
-0.032 
(1.33) 
-0.034 
(1.57) 
-0.004 
(0.18) 
-0.006 
(0.27) 
-0.004 
(0.16) 
GGDPt-1 -0.006 
(0.69) 
-0.004 
(0.38) 
-0.004 
(0.40) 
-0.004 
(0.40) 
-0.005 
(0.53) 
-0.007 
(0.75) 
-0.007 
(0.78) 
0.000 
(0.03) 
-0.003 
(0.25) 
-0.004 
(0.38) 
CPIt-1 0.006 
(0.50) 
-0.002 
(0.14) 
-0.004 
(0.27) 
-0.003 
(0.24) 
0.006 
(0.45) 
0.008 
(0.58) 
0.008 
(0.62) 
-0.007 
(0.55) 
-0.003 
(0.26) 
-0.004 
(0.28) 
Size it-1 -0.552 
(4.56)*** 
   -0.552 
(4.53)*** 
-0.576 
(4.35)*** 
-0.571 
(4.40)*** 
   
Liquidity it-1  0.044 
(0.91) 
  0.044 
(0.97) 
  0.045 
(0.91) 
0.061 
(1.22) 
 
Capitalisation it-1   0.108 
(1.06) 
  -0.0543 
(0.52) 
 0.109 
(1.05) 
 0.090 
(0.61) 
Risk it-1    0.099 
(0.85) 
  -0.0825 
(0.70) 
 0.148 
(1.22) 
0.023 
(0.14) 
Size it-1×∆Rt-1 0.030 
(1.63) 
   0.032 
(1.65) 
0.030 
(1.55) 
0.033 
(1.79) 
   
Liq it-1×∆Rt-1  0.005 
(0.24) 
  0.006 
(0.28) 
  0.007 
(0.34) 
0.009 
(0.42) 
 
Cap it-1×∆Rt-1   -0.001 
(0.05) 
  -0.002 
(0.04) 
 0.006 
(0.19) 
 -0.009 
(0.26) 
Risk it-1×∆Rt-1  
 
 0.012 
(0.64) 
  -0.008 
(0.36) 
 0.006 
(0.28) 
0.014 
(0.61) 
Size it-1× Liq it-1×∆Rt-1  
 
  0.007 
(0.19) 
     
Size it-1× Cap it-1×∆Rt-1  
 
   0.017 
(0.51) 
    
Size it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt-1       -0.019 
(0.91) 
   
Liq it-1× Cap it-1×∆Rt-1        0.042 
(1.01) 
  
Liq it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt-1         -0.021 
(0.99) 
 
Cap it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt-1          -0.001 
(0.01) 
Constant 0.220 
(0.56) 
0.796 
(2.00)* 
1.010 
(2.53)* 
0.953 
(2.45)* 
0.122 
(0.30) 
0.133 
(0.30) 
0.140 
(0.34) 
0.933 
(2.27)* 
0.826 
(2.06)* 
1.012 
(2.50)* 
R-squared   0.170 0.063 0.065 0.064 0.174 0.173 0.176 0.078 0.078 0.068 
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 
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Table 14C (Estimates of Model.1 using bank data. Hungary). 
* Indicates significance at 10%. 
** Idem, 5%. 
*** Idem, 1%. 
 
 Size Liq Cap Risk Size Liq Size Cap Size Risk Liq Cap Liq Risk Cap Risk 
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
∆Rt-1 0.019 
(0.53) 
0.024 
(0.78) 
0.017 
(0.45) 
0.024 
(0.65) 
0.041 
(1.32) 
0.014 
(0.34) 
0.025 
(0.69) 
0.024 
(0.79) 
0.027 
(0.91) 
0.034 
(0.90) 
GGDPt-1 -0.030 
(0.98) 
-0.021 
(0.81) 
-0.009 
(0.28) 
-0.015 
(0.46) 
-0.033 
(1.28) 
-0.029 
(0.94) 
-0.032 
(1.04) 
-0.021 
(0.78) 
-0.026 
(0.99) 
-0.017 
(0.54) 
CPIt-1 -0.005 
(0.82) 
-0.003 
(0.51) 
-0.009 
(1.42) 
-0.008 
(1.22) 
-0.003 
(0.50) 
-0.004 
(0.67) 
-0.004 
(0.66) 
-0.003 
(0.58) 
-0.005 
(0.86) 
-0.007 
(1.14) 
Size it-1 -1.392 
(4.13)*** 
 
 
 -0.726 
(2.37)* 
-1.442 
(3.90)*** 
-1.259 
(3.55)*** 
   
Liquidity it-1  0.825 
(7.30)***  
 0.731 
(6.20)*** 
  0.866 
(6.99)*** 
0.716 
(5.66)*** 
 
Capitalisation it-1   0.233 
(1.70) 
  0.056 
(0.40) 
 -0.056 
(0.47) 
 -0.215 
(0.88) 
Risk it-1    0.875 
(2.66)** 
  0.518 
(1.57) 
 -0.024 
(0.08) 
1.289 
(2.20)* 
Size it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.003 
(0.14) 
   0.012 
(0.51) 
0.021 
(0.64) 
0.006 
(0.23) 
   
Liq it-1×∆Rt-1  0.0204 
(0.97) 
  0.044 
(1.45) 
  0.023 
(1.05) 
0.079 
(2.14)* 
 
Cap it-1×∆Rt-1   0.0193 
(0.67) 
  0.042 
(0.64) 
 -0.009 
(0.37) 
 -0.031 
(0.64) 
Risk it-1×∆Rt-1  
 
 0.0239 
(1.07) 
  0.0392 
(0.81) 
 0.004 
(0.24) 
0.089 
(1.43) 
Size it-1× Liq it-1×∆Rt-1  
 
  0.048 
(1.57) 
     
Size it-1× Cap it-1×∆Rt-1  
 
   -0.003 
(0.07) 
    
Size it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt-1       0.007 
(0.23) 
   
Liq it-1× Cap it-1×∆Rt-1        -0.028 
(1.00) 
  
Liq it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt-1         0.166 
(2.05)* 
 
Cap it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt-1          -0.014 
(0.83) 
Constant 3.781 
(1.05) 
2.580 
(0.83) 
2.104 
(0.55) 
2.493 
(0.66) 
3.821 
(1.25) 
3.588 
(0.99) 
3.844 
(1.07) 
2.592 
(0.83) 
3.276 
(1.06) 
2.741 
(0.72) 
R-squared   0.18 0.39 0.067 0.11 0.44 0.20 0.22 0.40 0.42 0.12 
Observations 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 
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Table 14D (Estimates of Model.1 using bank data. Baltic States). 
* Indicates significance at 10%. 
** Idem, 5%. 
*** Idem, 1%. 
 
 Size Liq Cap Risk Size Liq Size Cap Size Risk Liq Cap Liq Risk Cap Risk 
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
∆Rt-1 0.004 
(0.40) 
0.004 
(0.29) 
-0.020 
(1.44) 
0.001 
(0.09) 
0.016 
(1.16) 
-0.014 
(0.96) 
0.003 
(0.27) 
0.005 
(0.22) 
0.006 
(0.41) 
-0.020 
(1.43) 
GGDPt-1 -0.006 
(1.86) 
-0.003 
(1.16) 
-0.003 
(0.93) 
-0.004 
(1.31) 
-0.006 
(2.06)* 
-0.005 
(1.63) 
-0.005 
(1.80) 
-0.002 
(0.80) 
-0.003 
(1.16) 
-0.002 
(0.82) 
CPIt-1 -0.013 
(7.85)*** 
-0.014 
(9.86)*** 
-0.014 
(9.86)*** 
-0.014 
(9.54)*** 
-0.011 
(6.75)*** 
-0.013 
(7.97)*** 
-0.012 
(7.71)*** 
-0.014 
(9.61)*** 
-0.014 
(9.25)*** 
-0.015 
(9.70)*** 
Size it-1 -0.282 
(3.20)** 
 
 
 -0.416 
(4.59)*** 
-0.250 
(2.81)** 
-0.271 
(3.00)** 
   
Liquidity it-1  0.099 
(2.54)*  
 0.161 
(4.08)*** 
  0.094 
(2.48)* 
0.099 
(2.53)* 
 
Capitalisation it-1   0.084 
(2.39)* 
  0.046 
(1.21) 
 0.084 
(2.41)* 
 0.082 
(1.95) 
Risk it-1    0.060 
(1.24) 
  0.026 
(0.53) 
 0.063 
(1.30) 
-0.010 
(0.19) 
Size it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.002 
(0.20) 
   -0.003 
(0.19) 
0.030 
(1.57) 
0.001 
(0.74) 
 -0.007 
(0.28) 
 
Liq it-1×∆Rt-1  -0.001 
(0.00) 
  -0.007 
(0.79) 
  -0.020 
(1.20) 
-0.002 
(0.19) 
 
Cap it-1×∆Rt-1   0.022 
(1.98)* 
  0.012 
(0.86) 
 0.003 
(0.16) 
 0.024 
(1.84) 
Risk it-1×∆Rt-1  
 
 0.003 
(0.28) 
  -0.018 
(1.00) 
  -0.017 
(1.06) 
Size it-1× Liq it-1×∆Rt-1  
 
  0.001 
(0.04) 
     
Size it-1× Cap it-1×∆Rt-1  
 
   -0.020 
(1.43) 
    
Size it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt-1       -0.028 
(1.50) 
   
Liq it-1× Cap it-1×∆Rt-1        0.015 
(1.06) 
  
Liq it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt-1         0.004 
(0.32) 
 
Cap it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt-1          0.007 
(0.66) 
Constant 2.326 
(6.73)*** 
2.196 
(6.13)*** 
2.148 
(5.99)*** 
2.333 
(6.51)*** 
1.953 
(5.67)*** 
2.199 
(6.19)*** 
2.278 
(6.51)*** 
1.935 
(5.33)*** 
2.108 
(5.76)*** 
2.131 
(5.91)*** 
R-squared   0.42 0.40 0.42 0.39 0.47 0.45 0.43 0.45 0.41 0.43 
Observations 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 
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Table 14E (estimates of Model.1 using bank data. Slovenia & Slovakia, Cyprus & Malta). 
* Indicates significance at 10%. 
** Idem, 5%. 
*** Idem, 1%. 
 
Slovenia & Slovakia Cyprus & Malta 
 Size Liq Cap Risk Size Liq Cap Risk 
Specification 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
∆Rt-1 0.112 
(1.42) 
0.078 
(0.99) 
0.132 
(1.54) 
0.177 
(2.89)* 
-1.093 
(2.74)* 
-0.069 
(0.17) 
-0.132 
(0.35) 
-0.012 
(0.03) 
GGDPt-1 -0.010 
(1.35) 
-0.007 
(0.92) 
-0.010 
(1.32) 
-0.005 
(0.91)     
Size it-1 -0.677 
(1.42) 
 
  
-1.192 
(3.66)**  
  
Liquidity it-1  0.299 
(2.16)*   
 -0.109 
(0.52) 
  
Capitalisation it-1   0.440 
(1.15) 
   -0.027 
(0.08) 
 
Risk it-1    1.233 
(3.88)** 
   0.112 
(0.21) 
Size it-1×∆Rt-1 -0.006 
(0.11) 
   0.564 
(1.80)  
  
Liq it-1×∆Rt-1  0.044 
(0.62) 
   0.045 
(0.10) 
  
Cap it-1×∆Rt-1   -0.057 
(0.29) 
   -0.836 
(1.57) 
 
Risk it-1×∆Rt-1  
 
 0.161 
(2.34)* 
   0.258 
(0.44) 
Size it-1× Liq it-1×∆Rt-1         
Size it-1× Cap it-1×∆Rt-1         
Size it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt-1         
Liq it-1× Cap it-1×∆Rt-1         
Liq it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt-1         
Cap it-1× Risk it-1×∆Rt-1         
Constant 1.292 
(1.62) 
0.922 
(1.18) 
1.328 
(1.64) 
0.849 
(1.37) 
0.488 
(3.54)** 
0.104 
(0.83) 
0.099 
(0.76) 
0.091 
(0.63) 
R-squared   0.24 0.34 0.22 0.56 0.53 0.05 0.18 0.04 
Observations 45 45 45 31 31 31 31 31 
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